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Russian voters cast ballots in a March 15-17 presidential election that was essentially to hand President Vladimir Putin another six-year term. Putin, who faced no real opponents in the election, was elected to a fifth term in a vote that was neither free nor fair.

The weekend election occurred just a month after the of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and amid a by Putin’s regime.

To help us better understand the implications of the election results and recent actions tied to Putin’s regime, we asked SIS professor Keith Darden a few questions about Russia’s future, including the standing of Belarusian-Russian relations.

Russian President Vladimir Putin cruised to a fifth term in elections held March 15-17, securing another six years in power through a vote in which he faced no serious opponents. This marked the first presidential election in Russia since the country’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. What role did Putin’s war in Ukraine and foreign policy more broadly play in how Russians view the regime?

The regime prevented any anti-war candidates from running in the election, which suggests that they considered this a potential point of vulnerability. Some opinion surveys suggest that approximately half the Russian population would like to see a peaceful settlement or cease-fire in the conflict.��But the high approval rating in pre-election surveys, high voter turnout, and the strong result for Putin suggests that the regime is not threatened.��The Russian economy seems to have successfully adapted to the sanctions, the reorientation of trade away from Europe, and the casualties. The population seems to accept that Russia is fighting a necessary but difficult war against the West and is creeping towards victory. The war is strengthening rather than weakening the regime.

The death of Russian opposition leader����in February made headlines worldwide and set off protests in Russia. Navalny’s allies have����that Putin had the opposition leader killed to thwart a prisoner swap.��Does the death of Navalny strike you as simply a brute show of force from Putin because he believes he’s untouchable? Or, conversely, might it indicate a feeling of vulnerability on Putin’s part, that having Navalny isolated in a Siberian prison wasn’t enough?

Navalny continued to be a political presence despite his incarceration and held out the hope for an alternative Russia after Putin’s death.��That kind of hope and aspiration for an alternative to Putin was a lingering political risk—particularly as Putin ages.��I would speculate that just as the regime has cracked down on military bloggers and younger anti-democratic nationalists who had gained attention, a decision was made to crush any hope of an alternative.��With Navalny, incarceration was not enough because he continued to have the courage to defy the regime.��They appear to have felt the need to eliminate the hope for an alternative future.

Do you anticipate that there will ever be a Russia without Putin in charge? Is there any political opposition that exists in any organized way in Russia?

Putin is mortal, so there will definitely be a Russia without Putin in charge.��Over the past year, the leadership’s tolerance for political opposition—particularly among the nationalist-imperialist wing of Russian politics—seems to have come to an end.��They are not letting any potential movements, even pro-war movements, organize in any form.��Prigozhin was killed, and Wagner dissolved.��Igor Girkin (“Strelkov”) was imprisoned, and several figures in the more militant nationalist movements have been killed or committed suicide.��The risk, of course, is that by removing all channels of opposition, the regime will be vulnerable to a sudden collapse, but, for now, it seems that they are managing to effectively prune away all the other potential organizations that could mount a political challenge to Putin’s rule.

In��, Putin has threatened conflict with nuclear weapons if NATO deploys troops to Ukraine. Recent reports also revealed that the United States has warned its allies that Russia could��launch a nuclear weapon��into orbit sometime this year. Are these threats an attempt by Putin to show strength, or does he feel intimidated by the possibility of NATO’s involvement in the war with Ukraine?

There is always a potential for bluff—especially since leaders have an incentive to see how far they can get with nuclear blackmail. My own view, however, is that Putin is not bluffing.��If NATO were to deploy troops to Ukraine and engage in direct overt fighting with Russian units, and if Russia felt that its conventional arsenal was insufficient against a NATO member and using its nuclear arsenal would be both militarily and psychologically effective (by striking bases in Poland, for example), then I suspect Russia would use nuclear weapons. There are a lot of steps there, and I don’t think we’ll cross them.��None of Russia’s allies want to see nuclear use.

Belarus shares a border with Russia and has played a����in Russia’s war in Ukraine. In recent parliamentary elections, only candidates loyal to authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko were allowed to run and opposition leaders remain behind bars, according to the��. What do close ties to Russia signify for Belarus’s future? Would you characterize Belarus as a vassal state at this point?

The Belarus-Russian relationship is complicated, and I would not describe it as one of vassalage.��Putin has never wanted to see Alexander Lukashenko stay in power in Belarus, but Lukashenko’s political vulnerability after the mass protest movement has made the Belarusian leader sufficiently dependent on Russia that they consider this a tolerable situation. Belarus allowed Russia to use its territory to mount attacks on Ukraine during the initial invasion, but that seems to have shifted somewhat in the past year. It’s also noteworthy that Lukashenko has not sent any Belarusian troops to fight in Ukraine, unlike Putin’s true vassals (like Ramzan Kadyrov of Chechnya).��So, while ties are close between the two countries, Lukashenko continues to carve out autonomy for himself and Belarus and to control his own domain.