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After several years of political turbulence, Slovak voters cast ballots September 30 in a parliamentary election that could impact aid for Ukraine in the war with Russia. Heading into the election, the nation had seen in five years.

The populist SMER party, headed by former Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, won��the parliamentary election Saturday when it secured��22.9% of the vote, . During the��campaign, he would not send “a single round” to Ukraine and even promised to veto Ukraine’s NATO application.

We asked SIS professors Alexandria Wilson-McDonald and Keith Darden to share their perspectives on how Slovakia’s recent election could impact support for Ukraine and what the election results may mean for stability in the region.

Since the murder of journalist Ján Kuciack and his fiancée in 2018, Slovakia has faced years of political turbulence. Over the last five years, the nation has had four prime ministers and just held another parliamentary election over the weekend. What was at stake for Slovakia heading into the September 30 election?

Alexandria Wilson-McDonald: Slovak politics have been tumultuous and divisive in recent years. On the one hand, in the years since the murder of journalist Ján Kuciack and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová, in 2018, Slovak activists have organized a pro-democracy, anti-corruption movement called “For a Decent Slovakia,” which was able to mobilize tens of thousands of people. In 2019, Zuzana Čaputová was elected as the first female president of the leftist party Progressive Slovakia.

On the other hand, however, 2020 saw the election of the most conservative parliament in Slovak history for that time. Right-wing parties, which have allied with the Catholic Church and conservative organizations to attack gender equality measures and LGBTQ+ rights since at least 2013, have continued their hateful rhetoric toward “gender” and the LGBTQ+ community. This has led to devastating consequences, such as the 2022 murder of two members of the LGBTQ+ community at a bar in Bratislava by the son of a politician from the non-parliamentary, far-right party Homeland (Vlasť).

This election was highly consequential for Slovaks as a return to power for Robert Fico and his party SMER (Direction) signals not only a change in direction on support for Ukraine, but also a continuation of his former policies of attacking gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, a continuation of his Eurosceptic message, and attacks on migrants. For example, in 2014, his party partnered with the Christian Democratic Movement and other conservative political parties within the Slovak Parliament to draft a constitutional amendment defining marriage as between a man and a woman. The Slovak Parliament subsequently adopted the proposed amendment, significantly limiting the rights of the LGBTQ+ community in the country. In 2018, Prime Minister Robert Fico and his government decided not to ratify The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, also known as the Istanbul Convention, an international convention to protect women and girls from violence. Fico and his allies claimed that the Convention was a form of "gender ideology" imposed by the West. In addition, many Slovak gender equality activists I have spoken with are very concerned about the Right's attacks on civil society actors and organizations working in the areas of gender and sexual equality.

In recent years, right-wing parties in government have used their position to place far-right actors in positions of power in Slovak government agencies. As a result, many agencies have ceased supporting organizations working on gender equality projects and have directed those finances to conservative organizations. They have worked to change the language used in Slovak policies toward issues like domestic violence, making them less inclusive. Many activists working to solve some of the most pressing issues for women, gender, and sexual minorities find it extremely difficult to work within their country as they lose support from these government agencies. Unfortunately, we can expect to see more of this, as well as increased Eurosceptic policies and anti-immigrant policies, with Fico as Prime Minster.��

Keith Darden: It is important not to overstate the stakes of a single election.��Fico’s party received less than a quarter of the popular vote—and given popular dissatisfaction due to high inflation and a refugee crisis sparked by the war, it is not surprising the incumbent party suffered at the polls.��This is unlikely to bring a sea change in Slovak politics, and the electorate has regularly been receptive to the type of populism that Fico espouses.

Robert Fico, former Slovakian prime minister, won the September 30 election and will once again lead the nation as prime minister. In your view, how will Fico’s time as prime minister impact stability in the region?

Darden: Slovakia borders Ukraine, but it does not play a critical role in maintaining stability on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States continues to be the primary provider of security assistance to Ukraine, even if indirectly.��Although Slovakia provided Ukraine with an S-300 air defense battery, Mi-17 helicopters, fighter aircraft, and other weaponry, it did so with the knowledge that the United States would provide it with a grant of $200 million in Foreign Military Funds to purchase replacement weaponry that was interoperable in NATO.����

��A Slovak “no” vote in European institutions when it comes to countering Russia or supporting Ukraine will not have a sizable impact.��European countries have played an important role in supporting Ukraine without backfilling from the US, but much of that support has taken place outside the institutions of the European Union or NATO.��A change in the government of Slovakia to a more pro-Russian government will not have a significant impact on the region except in one respect: NATO membership is extended only by unanimous consent among members of the alliance, and it seems that Ukraine will not be entering NATO under a Fico government.��

Wilson-McDonald: There has been significant democratic backsliding in Central East European states starting around 2010. The most well-known examples of this include Viktor Orbán’s quest to institute an “illiberal” democracy in Hungary and the right-wing Law and Justice Party in Poland.

The European Union (EU) was founded on the principles of economic cooperation and has integrated democratic requirements and human rights requirements into its framework over the years. These democratic foundations are threatened by EU member states when leaders take anti-democratic measures at home. Recently, the European Commission decided to withhold funds from Poland and Hungary for breaching rule of law principles. At the same time, far-right, Eurosceptic actors from these countries, including Slovakia, have used the EU as a stage for their illiberal messaging. For example, in 2013, the far-right Slovak anti-abortion activist Ann Záborská staged a successful mobilization against the 2013 Report on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, an EU resolution on women’s health and reproductive rights. The report called on EU Member States to provide comprehensive sex education in schools, provide access to sexual health, and safe contraception and abortion. The report also drew attention to concerns over gender-based violence. The European Parliament ultimately rejected the report following this conservative mobilization.

With the election of Robert Fico as Prime Minister, we can expect to see the addition of Slovakia to Hungary and Poland’s illiberal bloc in the EU, as well as a continuation of these attacks on democracy, civil society, and human rights at home, which threatens democracy at the European level.��

Analysts and political observers raised concern leading up to the election that a new government in Slovakia could impact the European Union’s unity over Ukraine. Based on these election results, where do you anticipate Slovakia will stand on support for Ukraine?

Wilson-McDonald: One of the most concerning aspects of this election is that Robert Fico and his party ran on a message of immediately ceasing all support for Ukraine if elected. It is also important to point out that Fico's rhetoric of opposing support for Ukraine is intricately tied to the current far-right, populist narrative of Euroscepticism, which attempts to construct anti-Western sentiment by tying "the West" to liberal ideas such as "gender ideology" and constructing these ideas as foreign imports that threaten the "traditional" family and, by extension, the nation. They attempt to rally voters to resist "gender ideology" and LGBTQ+ rights, which are then connected to anti-immigrant sentiment, Eurosceptism, and pro-Russian sentiment; this is what many scholars have referred to as “‘gender’ as symbolic glue."

It is relevant that drawing on this package of ideas, Fico has not only vowed to stop supporting Ukraine in their fight against Russian aggression but has repeated Russian propaganda regarding the invasion of Ukraine. This includes the unfounded claim that it was “Ukrainian Nazis and fascists” that started the war and repeating Putin's message that the West and NATO are to blame for his invasion of the country. Unfortunately, it seems that with the election of Robert Fico as Prime Minister, Slovakia will join the ranks of Viktor Orbán's Hungary in opposing assistance to Ukraine and supporting a pro-Putin message.

This potential waning of support for Ukraine is highly problematic in what seems like a war of attrition for Putin, where time and continued cracks in support for Ukraine will only benefit Russia.��

Darden: Fico stated during the campaign that Ukraine should not get any further assistance from Slovakia (“not one more cartridge”).��Even if Fico does not make good on his promise, the Slovak government will no longer be in the vanguard of European governments supporting further assistance to Ukraine.��Slovakia will join a growing number of European governments who do not see it as in their interests to provide the same high level of support to Ukraine.

Under Slovakia’s system, no prime minister can maintain their position without forming a coalition. In your view, what is the likelihood that Fico will be able to form a coalition?��

Darden: The natural coalition would be with Hlas (Voice) which was formed from a factional split within Fico’s own SMER party and finished third with 15% of the vote. The Slovak National Party, which shares the pro-Russian and nationalist foundations of SMER, is likely to be the third coalition partner. The key will be the negotiations between SMER and Hlas.��Given that the former needs the latter to form a government, there will be significant concessions required to hold the coalition together.

Wilson-McDonald: In the recent election, no party or alliance reached the threshold of 76 seats in Parliament needed to form a majority government. Thus, a coalition is required. SMER is likely to form a coalition with parties with similar stances, most likely the Hlas Party, which formed as an offshoot of SMER following a dispute in 2020. The third coalition partner could very well be the Slovak National Party, a nationalist party on the Right.����

The United States and Slovakia have strong diplomatic ties, and the nation has been a close NATO ally. Will the results of the September 30 election have any impact on US-Slovakia relations?

Wilson-McDonald: What we are seeing now is a significant shift in many Central East European countries, including Slovakia, in their relationship to the US. After the transition from communist regimes to democratic regimes in the 1990s, many countries joined NATO and the EU as a way to resist Russian influence and intervention in their countries. This is something that they were all too familiar with. In 1968, while Slovakia was part of Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact troops invaded the country to prevent liberalization and installed a hardline communist government.

To some today, Central Eastern Europe is seen as a monolithic region that came together in solidarity with the rest of Europe, the US, and others to support Ukraine. Some have attributed this to their history of invasion by the Nazi regime and Soviet regime in World War II and, for many, their various experiences of invasion by Warsaw Pact troops in the mid-twentieth century. Generally speaking, in the last two and a half years, there has been solidarity in support of Ukraine, but in the last two months, there have been increased complications to that in the region. For various reasons, some countries have provided more support to Ukraine than others, and in some, the support has started to falter. This is an indication of their unique divergences historically and today.

As it relates to US-Slovak relations, rather than viewing the region as homogenous in their support for Ukraine, these divergences are something that the US will have to continue to consider and negotiate as they build relations with Slovakia and work with Central European allies.��

Darden: Slovakia will continue to be a close NATO ally and is unlikely to return US military funding or support for border protection. A Fico government and a Biden administration are likely to be out of step on policy towards Russia and Ukraine, but this will not affect the fundamentals of the relationship. Slovakia is unlikely to turn toward Russia in anything other than rhetoric.

Over the last few years, several European countries have elected far-right politicians and/or leaned toward nationalism. Does the election of Robert Fico follow any major regional political trends?

Darden: The war has brought about the re-nationalization of Europe in many respects.��This election is partly reflective of that trend, but I would be cautious in reading in too much about a right-ward shift.��Two years of war in Ukraine following on the back of the hardships of COVID was going to make it hard for any incumbent party to do well.��What we are seeing here is perhaps less a vote for nationalist ideology than a vote against inflation, refugees, and a pro-European governing elite.

Wilson-McDonald: As mentioned earlier, the election of Robert Fico and his party, SMER, certainly follows the trend in the region of the rise of far-right, populist leaders and parties. This trend not only threatens unity in the EU and support for Ukraine but also comes with a host of other policy implications—Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant policies, anti-LGBTQ+ rights policies, and policies that counter gender equality measures.

I think it is crucial to note that while this is in line with current anti-democratic trends, and it can mean significant changes in Slovakia’s policy toward Ukraine, among other policy changes, not everyone in the region or the country supports this direction. Earlier this year, Petr Pavel won the Czech Republic’s presidential election. As a former army chief and NATO official, he ran on a platform of supporting Ukraine and was able to beat the former populist Prime Minister Andrej Babis.

As it relates to Slovakia, for comparison, the 2020 parliamentary elections in Slovakia led to the most conservative parliament in Slovak history at that time, and the Progressive Slovakia Party failed to gain enough votes to enter parliament. Today, while Robert Fico’s SMER party won 22.9% of the vote, Progressive Slovakia won 17.9%. This indicates that there is dissent in the region, and far-right leaders will not necessarily have an easy path as they work to push their countries further to the right.��